INTRODUCTION
One model of how citizens respond to an issue moving on and off the public agenda, the Conditional Response Model (Johnson and Martin, 1998) , suggests that the key determinant of how these agenda shifts affect citizens is the number of times an issue has been raised by a political actor. elaborating on his or her attitude, then the effect of this processing is stronger, longer lasting, and resistant to further processing. In contrast, peripheral processing is largely ephemeral. This processing is more cursory and is relatively short lived. The Conditional Response Model holds that the first time an issue is raised by a political actor citizens process the information centrally, elaborating their attitudes. That is, citizens' attitudes will go from unstructured and essentially random to meaningful concrete attitudes. The systematic nature of attitudes and, more importantly, the factors that divide and polarize the public will become more meaningful. This crystallization and polarization then remains in perpetuity. If the actor raises the issues again it will not be able to influence the public and there will be no change in either the structure of an individual's attitudes or the polarization between groups in the public.
The Conditional Response Model's basis in public opinion is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)
This model of attitude formation, however, is out of line with the prevailing understanding of mass political attitudes. We believe that this is both a misreading of the ELM and fundamentally incorrect under a competing model, Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model (Zaller, 1992 ) of attitude formation. With the RAS, if there is a heated debate about an issue, a "twosided" information environment, there will be a considerable amount of consistency within groups (parties, religious affiliations) as individuals rely on elite cues to find the relevant considerations. In contrast, if there is no debate about the issue, a "zero-sided" information environment, voters cannot use elite cues to piece together their considerations and attitudes will be less consistent within relevant groups. A political actor's role, then, is to move the issue from a "zero-sided" information environment to a "twosided" one. Instead of focusing on the number of times an issue has been raised on the public's agenda, we focus on the state of public opinion and citizens' attitudes at the time the political actor raises the issue. To do this we focus on one particular influence, the US Supreme Court, and one issue, abortion. We make this choice in part because repeated Supreme Court decisions on an issue present an opportunity to see how a political actor's effect on public opinion evolves with repeated actions on an issue. We also choose to examine the influence of the Court because of its unique role in politics and the growing understanding of how the public reacts to the Court (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989; Johnson and Martin, 1998) .
This article develops and tests a set of hypotheses intended to our understanding of how political actors in general, and the Supreme Court in particular influence the state of public opinion. In the next section, we discuss the two models of attitude formation and change more, focusing on how repeated exposure to political information should affect attitudes. Next, we lay out the specific area where these hypotheses will be tested: public reactions to Supreme Court decisions on abortion. We then discuss the importance of how the Court influences the public. That is, we believe that while we contribute to the broad theory of attitude change, the specific question of how the Supreme Court in particular influences the public is important and understudied. Next, we provide the results for how the Court influences the public for three abortion cases: Roe v. Wade, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, and Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danforth. This section is a mix of summarizing previous research, reanalyzing old data, and presenting new work on a previous unstudied decision. While the key difference we focus on is the impact of repeated political information, the data we have allow us to test some of the specific elements of the RAS model. Finally, we conclude by discussing the importance of these results for our understanding of attitude formation and change and the influence of the Supreme Court in American politics.
Models of Attitude Formation and Change1
Again, the Conditional Response Model rests on a particular understanding of the ELM, a model based on the work of Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, b) and has been applied by numerous political scientists ( Mondak, 1990 Mondak, , 1993a Mutz, 1998; Nelson and Oxley, 1999) . According to the ELM, people process information and form attitudes either centrally or peripherally. Central processing implies that the person carefully considers the content of information, determines how the information relates to their current attitude, and changes the attitude in response to this new information. This change, then, is relatively permanent and the attitude itself is somewhat resistant to further attempts at persuasion. Centrally processed (or elaborated) attitudes are more meaningful and stable evaluations of some attitude object. In peripheral processing, the person uses short cuts (length of an argument implies correctness or the credibility of the source) and accepts or rejects the information based on these cues without fully evaluating the content of the message itself. Peripheral processing leads to short lived and transient changes in attitudes. The person is not insulated from further attempts at persuasion and should respond to messages in the future. Peripherally processed attitudes are relatively unstable and do not provide much of a structure to how the person thinks or behaves. From this model, Johnson and Martin's Conditional Response Model holds that the first time an issue is raised on the public agenda, citizens will engage in central processing and this central processing will insulate citizens from subsequent attention to an issue. Thus, the Conditional Response Model relies on two derivations of the ELM. First, that evidence of systematic attitude change and polarization implies that central processing occurred. And second, that once central processing occurs, further attitude change will not occur. Neither of these assumptions, we believe, fit with the prevailing understanding of the ELM. The evidence for central processing posited to support the Conditional Response Model is evidence of polarization on an issue among various groups (i.e. race or gender is a stronger predictor of an attitude after it is placed on the public agenda). The assumption of this test for central processing is that peripheral processing must produce essentially random change in attitudes. It need not. Peripheral processing can invoke the same set of predispositions as central processing; only how they are used will differ. More importantly, both types of processing will be indistinguishable from the type of evidence that has been used to support the Conditional Response Model.
As for the second implication, that central processing means there will be no subsequent change, there is no evidence that repetition will have no influence over centrally processed attitudes. While centrally processed attitudes may be more resistant to change than peripherally processed attitudes, there is no reason to expect them to be completely resistant to change. Subsequent events that raise an issue may result in more central processing and more attitude change.
Furthermore, we believe that the empirical predictions derived from the Conditional Response Model are at odds with a second, equally sound model of attitude change: Zaller and Feldman's RAS model (Feldman, 1995; Zaller, 1992; Zaller and Feldman, 1992 ).2 The model is based on three axioms. First, citizens are ambivalent about most issues; they hold considerations that support either side of an issue. Second, a person's attitude about an issue is shaped by the considerations accessible in his or her memory. When asked to express a political attitude people quickly canvas their memories for the most accessible considerations and put them together. Third, the accessibility of these considerations is shaped by balance of information in the public debate about the issue. The RAS model, then, implies that the effect from the initial discussion of an issue should not be any different than subsequent discussions as citizens construct their attitudes based on what considerations are accessible, and this accessibility will be altered each time an issue is raised. Citizens should not become insulated from the effect of elite discourse.3
We turn to the RAS model in part because we think it is a better depiction of the empirical evidence in support of the Conditional Response Model. That model is fundamentally about the attitudes of individual citizens, the evidence Johnson and Martin marshal in support of it is aggregate in nature. They base their conclusion on the aggregate shifts in public opinion along identified groups in the electorate. The ELM is a model of how individual process and use information, while the RAS is more of a model of how we see differences in the public manifest as a result of changes in the information environment. Because this is the phenomenon studied here, we feel that the RAS may be the more appropriate psychological model of how citizens react.
Thus, both a broader reading of the ELM and the RAS raise questions with the key hypothesis of the Conditional Response Model. Based on either psychological model, there is no theoretically sound reason to expect that the number of times an issue has been raised to impact the likelihood of a political actor influencing public opinion. In the ELM, discourse on an issue should produce more predictability in an individual's attitudes and more polarization between groups that disagree on the issue as citizens process the information (using either central or peripheral processing) and change their attitudes in response. The predictions from the RAS model are similar. Zaller places the impetus for change in the content of attitudes on the changing information environment. While he emphasizes the difference between "one-sided" and "two-sided" information flows (where only one side of an issue is raised and where both sides of an issue are discussed), the relevant distinction here is between "zero-sided" and two-sided information flows. The case we are interested in is when an issue goes from negligible discussions to prominent discussions in the information environment. As the information environment changes and the issue is the subject of discussion, citizens are provided the cues to map their predispositions onto their attitudes. Citizens become polarized and predispositions become better predictors of attitudes. In either case, there is nothing inherent about the number of times an issue has been raised on the public's agenda that limits how citizens will respond.
This hypothesis is about the attitudes of individuals. To test it exactly as formulated, we need long-term panel data that coincides with changes in the amount of discussion an issue receives from elites. No such data exist. Instead, we test an aggregate corollary of the hypothesis (the same aggregate corollary that Johnson and Martin test). If the structure of citizens' attitudes change, if issue attitudes become more predictable based on some set of predispositions as a result of changes in the information environment, then we should see the patterns of attitudes change predictably across groups of citizens. That is, if the cues that form the information environment enable a link between gender and the attitude, then gender should be a stronger predictor of the attitude after the issue is prevalent in the information environment than it was before the discussion. We should see a greater polarization in the electorate after the issue is made salient than we see before.
This is easier to test. Instead of data on the same citizens before and after an issue is raised, we only need comparable samples of citizens asked identical questions before and after the issue is raised (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989 The second need for examining the influence of repeated messages on public opinion in this way is for multiple, discrete, and similar messages about the same general issue over time. This seems obvious but it creates a certain difficulty. We need to be able to isolate discrete events or actions that forced an issue onto the political agenda. Again, we believe that the influence of the Court is a perfect case. Court decisions are identified as a single event on a single day. Moreover, there have been several decisions on abortion, meaning it is possible to address how repeated events affect citizens' attitudes. Finally, the decisions we examine occur at long enough intervals that the effect of the previous rulings should have decayed.
CITIZEN RESPONSE TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

REACTIONS TO THE SUPREME COURT: PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED DECISIONS
We now turn to the analyses of public response to Supreme Court decisions on abortion. Again, we are not the first to address these and, to a small extent, we are going to accept some of the conclusions of the extant literature while challenging others. Before we present our analysis of a previously unstudied decision, we examine Roe v. Wade and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services to summarize the effects of other decisions. Table 1 provides a simple summary of the competing predictions for the effect of the three cases we will examine. All of the models predict that the Roe decision will influence public opinion. There is little to be learned from this decision. The difference between the Conditional Response Model and the hypothesis we derive here focus on the later decisions. The Conditional Response Model holds that Roe is the only decisions that will change the structure of public opinion. In contrast, the RAS and the ELM hold that the later decisions, if they generate discussion and thought about abortion should influence public opinion. These results seem conclusive-the subsequent Court decision did not alter public opinion. We re-visit this question because of some questionable decisions on the coding of the independent variables. The second column of Table 2 reports the results from a model with three changes. First, we change the coding of the race of the respondent (labeled non-white). In their original coding, Johnson and Martin code race as African-American or white, omitting the respondents who categorized their race as "other," the remaining option given. While this choice is clearly defensible, it is not costless. Of the 104 respondents who list their race as other, 45 are also Hispanic (a separate question asked after the race question). In our model we include these respondents and code race as zero if the respondent is white and one if the respondent answered black or other (still omitting those respondents who refuse to identify their race). The second change is to include the age of the respondent as a predictor of abortion attitudes.
Finally, Johnson and Martin do not include partisanship as an independent variable in their model. By 1989, the link between abortion and party was strong. Thus, we believe any model explaining abortion attitudes that omits 
Data
The standard approach to examining public reaction to Supreme Court cases to this point has relied on pairs of surveys taken before and after the Court cases. Again, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) Finally, these data have two unique advantages over the previous data. First, they are a wide-scale survey of politics. They contain many relevant predictors of abortion attitudes, but they also include several other issues. This will allow us to compare the changes in abortion attitudes to changes in other issues; to separate changes in abortion attitudes from general fluctuations in political attitudes at the same point in time. We also have five surveys within the same year so we can see if abortion attitudes changed at other points in 1976 or only after the Supreme Court decision. These tests, which no other study of the Supreme Court's influence perform, allow us to isolate the Court as the unique force behind change in public opinion.
Second, and most important, these are panel data. We track the abortion attitudes of the same people before and after the decision. We do not need to simply look for aggregate differences in abortion attitudes within groups (the basic method used elsewhere) but can look to see exactly who changed their minds. This will be stronger evidence for the influence of the court, and will allow us to test specific hypotheses of attitude formation and change.
PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE DANFORTH
While the data may have strengths that previous data do not, we begin by ignoring these and taking the same approach as previous scholars. To that end, we largely ignore the panel nature of the data (except for correcting the standard errors to account for possible correlations within individual across the two waves) and treat the data as if they were two independent cross sections. To do so we pool the two waves of the data that bracket the decision and include an interaction terms between each of the predictors and the wave indicator.
To reiterate the competing hypotheses, the Conditional Response Model
suggests that the interaction terms should be jointly insignificant. The Court has already issued a ruling on abortion and the public's attitudes should have been elaborated. Our hypothesis, however, suggests that the terms should be jointly significant. If the Court's decision altered elite discourse and placed abortion on the public's agenda, the public should have become more crystallized on abortion.9
We have tried to include most of the same independent variables as Franklin and Kosaki (1989) and Johnson and Martin (1998), but because these data are richer, we have added some additional predictors. Partisanship is the standard seven-point scale from strong Democrat to strong Republican. Age is coded in years. We include three dummy variables indicating whether or not the person is Male, White, or Catholic. We code the respondent's Education as zero if he or she did not finish high school, one if he or she attended but did not finish college, two if he or she is a college graduate and three if he or she did some post college schooling. We also include the Number of children the respondent has. Church attendance is a four-point scale ranging from never attending to regularly attending. We use OLS to estimate the model. Table 3 presents the results of the model predicting the effect of the Court decisions on mass abortion attitudes. Given the multicollinearity between the interaction terms, readers should not give too much credence to the significance of the specific coefficients. The key test of the hypothesis is not how the electorate polarized, but if the electorate polarized at all. Just as in Table 1 , the important hypothesis test centers on the test of the joint significance of all of the interaction terms. If the electorate did not polarize after the Danforth decision, then these terms will be jointly insignificant. If the electorate did react as predicted by our hypothesis, then the link between abortion attitudes and their determinants will be stronger in the later survey and the interaction terms will be jointly significant. The results are clear. The joint F-test of the interactions is significant (p<.05). We can reject the null hypothesis of no polarization and conclude the data do not support the Conditional Response Model.
Our argument hinges on the influence of the court decision. These results are not conclusive. While this change may have been induced by the Court, there are countless other sources of change.1' To account for some of these differences, we also look for change in the public's attitudes on other issues in the same time span, as well as change in abortion attitudes at other points in time. If this were merely some odd time of variability in political opinions and not something about abortion per se, we would expect to find several issues exhibiting the same type of change. Additionally, if it were something about abortion in general and not abortion at this particular point in time, we would expect to see significant changes in abortion Table 3 . Thus, the final analyses here are for the waves of the panel that are before and after the Supreme Court decision, but not he waves that are immediately adjacent to each other. Table 4 
FURTHER TESTS OF THE MODELS
We are now convinced that a unique change took place on abortion attitudes at this point in time. While this is supportive of our basic hypotheses and counter to the counter to the Conditional Response Model, there is another way to test the RAS and our interpretation of the ELM. An element of the both models that we have yet to discuss is the prediction of who should be influenced by the changes in the information environment. In the RAS, change in attitudes is a function of both the likelihood of receiving and accepting information. Reception is positively correlated with political knowledge--those who know more receive more information. Acceptance, however, is negatively related as those who are more knowledgeable are resistant to change because they can resist information's persuasive influence. Thus, the citizens who are likely to be influence by information are those in the middle of political knowledge. Petty's work on the ELM has demonstrated a similar pattern-that the people most likely to be influenced by information are those in the middle levels of issue importance (Petty, Wegener, and Fabrigar, 1997). In both theories, citizens are engaged in politics enough to receive the information, but not enough to be insulated from the information's persuasive effects.
To test this, we divided the sample based on the respondent's level of knowledge about abortion. While Zaller suggests a battery of factual political knowledge questions, no such questions exist in the data. Instead, we rely on what we believe is a measure of Issue specific political knowledge: the number of candidates and parties the respondent is able to place on the abortion scale in the June wave of the panel (see Gilens 2001 for a discussion of the use of general or specific knowledge measures)."l We re-estimate the models from Table 3 for three separate portions of the sample. The first, the low sophistication category contains those who could not place any candidate on the abortion scales (399 respondents in the analysis). The second, high sophistication category contains those respondents who could place every candidate on the scale (427 respondents). The middle category, the one that is expected to contain the largest effects, is made up of those respondents who placed some, but not all of the candidates (552 respondents). Table 5 presents the results from these models. The key test is whether or not the interaction terms significantly improve the fit of the model. These results are reported at the bottom of the table. Both the most and the least sophisticated are unaffected by the Supreme Court. While these results do not test why, presumably the most sophisticated already had strong enough attitudes to be unaffected, while the least sophisticated probably did not encounter much new information. In contrast there is a significant change (p<.05) in the structure of attitudes amongst those in the middle category of abortion specific sophistication (third column). It is precisely this group that should encounter some new information, but not have attitudes strong enough to resist the persuasion.
Panel Models
At this point, we know that patterns of support for abortion changed after Danforth. We also know that this change was unique to abortion and this specific time. Finally, it is clear that the changes occurred most among the moderately sophisticated. What we do not know about this, or any other study of public reaction to Supreme Court decisions, is who changes their (Gilbert, 1993) .
To account for all of these religious factors we include the same three independent variables included above: a Catholic indicator, a measure of church attendance, and an Interaction between the two. Our expectation is that the interaction term will be negative and significant. If adherent Catholics have accessible considerations prior to the Court case they will be unlikely to change after the decision. The Catholic term, which can be interpreted as the impact of being a non-adherent Catholic, should be positive and significant, as the Court decision may have led these lapsed Catholics to connect their religion and their politics. The attendance term, as the impact of attendance on Protestants, should also be positive, indicating that the information made available in church lead people to change their mind.
Additionally, we expect that the young and uneducated are likely to have less accessible considerations and, therefore, be more likely to change their position after the Court decision. Thus, both coefficients should be negative. We also include controls for gender and the number of children the respondent has. We have no a priori expectations about who may be more likely to change their attitude, only that there may be some differences, especially given the results in Table 3 . Given this is a presidential campaign, we include a measure of Attention to the presidential campaign and expect that it will be positive-those who pay more attention to the information environment should be more likely to receive the information and be influenced by the Court. This also serves as a test of whether the presidential campaign may be driving these results. If it is the campaign of the candidate that induces the change, we would expect those who are paying attention to the campaign to be more likely to change than those who are oblivious to the larger debate.'5 Finally, we include a measure of partisanship. Our expectation is not that Democrats will differ from Republicans. The key distinction, we believe, is between partisans of either side and Independents. Those who should change their opinion are those who do not have clear cues to connect predisposition to abortion before the court decision, but do after the court decision. In 1976, partisanship and abortion were only weakly connected. In a low information environment, it would be difficult for individuals to automatically connect the two. After the decision, after the Court placed abortion on the public agenda, the connection between party and abortion may have been induced in the elite reaction. Thus, independents should be less likely to change than partisans.
This test also provides evidence that the changes are not mere instability. It is well known that most people do not have consistent attitudes on most issues. At the same time, partisans will usually have more consistent attitudes than independents. If what we see is merely evidence of the public's instability, then one would expect partisans to be less likely to exhibit change. Of course, the results in Table 3 above also suggest that the change is not random, but it is worth noting that evidence may be found here as well. Table 6 This work is far from definitive. While it is a first step in understanding the dynamics of how citizens respond to the changing information environment, much work needs to be done. First and foremost, these results need to be extended to other issues and other actors. As noted above, one advantage of Johnson and Martin is that they examine both abortion and the death penalty, finding no reaction to the second or third death penalty decisions handed down by the Court. We have suggested that the number of Supreme Court decisions is not likely to explain these results. The question, then, is what does drive these effects. We do not know. We simply do not have a large enough sample of Supreme Court decisions to develop different predictions about when cases should matter and when they should not.
Finding additional instances with comparable changes in the information environment across time would enable us to begin to find systematic, explainable patterns in public reactions and develop a broader theory of how citizens interact with the dynamics of the information environment.
Finally, this paper provides no evidence about which model of public opinion (RAS or ELM) describes public opinion. These are different models that have contrasting implications for public opinion. In this case, both of the models generate the same hypotheses. There are other cases, however, where the models may generate competing explanations. Given the prominence of both models, we think it would worthwhile for scholars to tease out the differences in the predictions each model generates and design a series of experiments to separate the two models empirically. NOTES 1. Note that we are not discussing a separate but common division between online and memory-based models of attitude formation. Both of these models are subsets of the memorybased class of models. We ignore the online models largely because we believe that, while they may be accurate depictions of how citizens evaluate candidates, there is no evidence that they describe the process by which citizens form issue attitudes (Lavine, 2002 
The only change between the results presented here and those reported by Johnson and
Martin is how the statistics package used handles the constant in an ordered probit model. Their package includes one; the package we used omits it and includes an additional cut point. This difference is a statistical technicality and does not alter any of the substantive conclusions. 5. At the same time, these were different issues than were dealt with in Roe. Danforth focused almost exclusively on the issue of consent, a topic that Roe was largely silent on. We do not believe this creates a problem, however. While the distinction between legal issues of the case is important for jurisprudence, it is likely to be lost on the vast majority of the public. Furthermore, if the mechanism behind the Court's influence is the discussions about the issue, the fine distinction between this case and Roe or Webster should not matter. All that is relevant is whether the decision provoked discussion amongst the public about abortion. 6. The data were originally collected by Thomas E. Patterson Table 1 is from June to August. 13. The ability or willingness to place a candidate on an issue scale is not a perfect measure of the amount of information the respondent has. It is however, one that has been used elsewhere (Bartels, 1986 ) and the best available in this data. In some respects we believe this measure is superior to a measure of general political knowledge for testing the effects of sophistication. The key element to the RAS model is how much the person has thought about the issue--how many considerations are prominent in the person's mind and how well the individual can process the information. General political sophistication taps both of these generally. We believe, however that an issue specific knowledge measure taps the strength of abortion attitudes in particular more directly. 14. The "Protestant" category also contains Jews and those who refuse to give a religious identification. They will be discussed as "Protestants" for ease of discussion, since Protestants are the dominant category. Self-identified Protestants make up roughly two thirds of this category, Jews less than one-tenth and those who refuse any label around one-quarter. Unfortunately, the survey did not ask the respondent to list their specific denomination so it is impossible to split Protestants into the more meaningful categories of Mainline and Evangelical. 15. The Patterson survey also asked extensive questions about how much attention the respondent paid to the political conventions-the main campaign events that took place in the same timeframe. We also ran four models to incorporate the effect of exposure to the conventions themselves. The first had a single summary of the attention paid to both conventions. The second model had attention to the conventions included separately. The third and fourth models had, respectively, only attention to the Democratic and Republican conventions. In no case did adding the convention measures improve the fit of the model. Thus, we believe it was not the conventions that lead to changing attitudes. 16. We also re-estimated the models after splitting the sample based on how important the respondent felt abortion was prior to the decision. For those respondents who felt abortion was not important, we see the same patterns of predictors as significant. For those who felt abortion was important before the decision, nothing significantly predicts the probability of attitude change. In fact all of the predictors are jointly insignificant. All of the systematic movement on abortion attitudes came from those who did not think the issue was important prior to the decision.
